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INTRODUCTION

In his famous Stanford Law Review article, When Worlds Collide,' Professor
Marc Franklin foretold the troubles for American law in the impending collision of
the tort of strict liability with the warranty of merchantability.2 We daily suffer the
reverberations from that collision as courts struggle with the proper application of
strict tort liability and breach of warranty in products liability cases.
Lawyers who have not studied Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code
(U.C.C.) are surprised to learn that virtually every buyer who has a strict tort claim
for an injury caused by a defective product also has a potential claim in warranty
for the same injury.3 Of course, the converse is not true; many unmerchantable
products are not "unreasonably dangerous,"4 cannot fulfill strict tort's "physical
harm" requirement,5 and therefore cannot be the source of a strict tort claim. These
products might cause loss of revenue or commercial disappointment but do not
threaten life, limb or property. Thus, the courts must not only untangle tort from
warranty where each is available, but also draw the line that marks warranty's

* RobertA. SullivanProfessorofLawUniversity ofMichiganLawSchool. B.A. 1956,Amherst
College; J.D. 1962, University ofMichigan. I wishto thank Jennifer Young'02 and StewartMcQueen
'02, University of South Carolina School of Law, for their research assistance.
1. Marc A. Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimersin DefectiveProduct Cases, 18 STAN. L. REv. 974 (1966).
2. Id. at 990-1016. The collision is not just with the warranty of merchantability but also with
express and other implied warranties.
3. Of course, that statement is a slight exaggeration, for each legal claim is subject to different
defenses thatmightbe available in oneregimebutnot the other and vice versa. These are defenses like
statute of limitations, absence of reliance, disclaimer of warranty, or lack of privity, to name a few.
4. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 402A (1965).
5. Id.
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exclusive domain. This line is sometimes called the "economic loss" doctrine;
loss
6
that is solely "economic" may be recovered in warranty but not in tort.
In Part II of this Essay, I discuss the early development of strict tort, the
framers of which could not have foreseen the later erosion of warranty defenses. In
Part III, I discuss the reverberations of the collision of strict tort and warranty, as
evidenced by cases in which courts have struggled with the proper application of
those theories in the products liability context. In Part IV, I discuss several cases
that reach conflicting conclusions about the availability of damages in tort or
warranty where there has been no overt failure of the plaintiff's product. As I
suggest below, this is a significant reverberation from the collision of tort and
warranty, for the courts have sometimes confused tort and warranty, sometimes
confused liability with remedy, and frequently failed to identify the theory that they
were considering. In Part V, I conclude by noting that if, as appears, some damages
are often available in warranty in these cases, but not in tort, then the cases raise
questions as to which outcome is better and about the res judicata effect of a
modest warranty recovery on a later and larger potential tort recovery.
I start by defending this endeavor. Why would anyone, who did not have to do
so, write about the collision of tort and warranty? Lawyers and judges must deal
with this mess in our law, but any right thinking law professor could content
himself with criticizing the current regime and explaining why it should be
radically modified.
Ifthere were even the smallest prospect of that modification, such criticism and
explanation would be justified. But there is no prospect for real reform. Having
been through a fourteen-year attempt to revise the parts of Article 2 that are much
farther from the heat than the warranty of merchantability, I am certain that the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) could
not propose, nor the states adopt, a uniform law on products liability that would
take the place of warranty and tort. The plaintiffs' lawyers would be bitter and
effective opponents of such a change, and the defense bar would pay no more than
lip service. Indeed, the difficult birth of the Restatement (Third) ofTorts: Products

6. See, e.g., Rich Prods. Corp. v. Kemutec Inc., 241 F.3d 915, 918 (7th Cir. 2001) ("From its
inception the economic loss doctrine has been based on an understanding that contract law and the law
of warranty, in particular, is better suited than tort law for dealing with purely economic loss in the
commercial arena.") (quoting Daanen &Janssen, Inc. v. Cedarapids, Inc., 573 N.W.2d 842,846 (Wis.
1998)); Callowayv. City of Reno, 993 P.2d 1259,1264 (Nev. 2000) ("Because of... the... confusion
created between tort and warranty theories, the economic loss doctrine gained recognition and support.
The doctrine serves to distinguishbetween tort, or duty-based recovery, and contract, orpromise-based
recovery, and clarifies that economic losses cannot be recovered under a tort theory."); Steiner v. Ford
Motor Co., 606 N.W.2d 881, 884 (N.D. 2000) ("Under the doctrine, economic loss resulting from
damage to a defective product, as distinguished from damage to other property or persons, may be
recovered in a cause of action for breach of warranty or contract, but not in a tort action ....
'The
economic loss doctrine recognizes the distinction between the bargain expectation interests protected
by contract law under the Uniform Commercial Code and the safety interests protected by tort law."')
(quoting Clarys v. Ford Motor Co., 592 N.W.2d 573, 578 (N.D. 1999)).
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Liability (ProductsLiability Restatement) in the American Law Institute (ALI),7
where any proposal needs only the vote of the membership and not the vote of any
state legislature, indicates that a more radical reform would not pass the state
legislatures without great difficulty. That being so, I content myself with repair of
a small part of the collision's damage.
II. ANCIENT HISTORY
Though they could hardly have foreseen the collision of strict tort with
warranty, our brightest activist judges and law professors of the early and midtwentieth century set tort in motion towards the collision that now seems to have
been inevitable. The most prominent of these men were Cardozo, Traynor, and
Prosser. We thank Justice Cardozo for the abolition of privity in tort,8 Justice
Traynor for advocating strict liability as the most efficient means ofrisk allocation,9
and Dean Prosser as the academic" ° and legislative advocate of expanded tort
liability. Prosser was the Reporter for the Restatement (Second)of Torts;he drafted
§ 402A, the source of most strict tort law.
Prosserwas an unashamed advocate of"risk spreading;" inis hornbook"1 and
in scholarly joumals he openly asserted the virtues of adopting a system that could

7. David Owen, ProductsLiabilityLaw Restated, 49 S.C. L. REV. 273,279 (1998) (noting that
the full ALI membership debated and voted on drafts of the ProductsLiabilityRestatement in 1994,
1995, and 1996 "until the Institute's final debate and adoption of the ProposedFinalDraftin May
1997.'). Professor Owen further notes that prior to the publication of the final version of the Products
LiabilityRestatement,"the ALI published a total oftwelve drafts of various portions of the work." Id.
at 279 n.39. The vote approving the ProposedFinalDraft in May 1997 was unanimous. Id. at 279.
8. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1051 (N.Y. 1916).
9. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963) (adopting strict
liability as advocated in Traynor's Escoladissent and noting that"[tihe purpose of such liability is to
insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that
put such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect
themselves."); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440-44 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J.
dissenting) ("In my opinionitshouldnowbe recognized that a manufacturer incurs an absolute liability
when an article thathehas placed on the market, knowing thatitis tobe used without inspection, proves
to have a defect that causes injury to human beings.").
10. William L. Prosser, The Fall ofthe Citadel (StrictLiability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L.
REV. 791 (1966) [hereinafter Prosser, The Fallofthe Citadel];William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon
the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960) [hereinafter Prosser, The
Assault Upon the Citadel];see also G. EDWARD WHrr, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL
HISTORY 168-73 (1985) (describing Dean Prosser's contributions to products liability law).
11. WLL Am L. PROssER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTs 495 (4th ed. 1971) ("The problem
is dealt with as one of allocating a more or less inevitable loss to be charged against a complex and
dangerous civilization, and liability is imposed upon the party best able to shoulder it.").
12. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel,supra note 10, at 1120 ("Entitled to more respect is
the 'risk-spreading' argument, whichmaintains that the manufacturers... should absorb the inevitable
losses which must result in a complex civilization from the use of their products, because they are in
a better position to do so, and through theirprices to pass such losses on to the community at large.");
Prosser, The Fallof the Citadel,supra note 10, at 799 ("The public interest in human safety requires
the maximum possible protection for the user of the product, and those best able to afford it are the
suppliers of the chattel.").
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make manufacturers involuntary insurers of the buyers of their products. Judges
spoke from a different pulpit; their voices were constrained by the cases that came
before them, but I suspect that Justice Traynor'3 and many others14 shared Prosser's
thinking about the virtues of spreading the cost and risk of injury by putting the loss
on the defendant and causing him to add it to the cost of products.
Clearly, Prosser saw the relation between strict tort and warranty. He defended

strict tort by noting that it would be free of the defenses that, in his mind, hobbled
warranty as a source of risk spreading. He noted that plaintiffs were often turned
away by disclaimers, notice requirements, or by lack of privity when they sued in
warranty 5 and so Prosser supported § 402A. 6
What Prosser failed to foresee was the erosion of those warranty defenses.
Today, privity is in decline as a defense in warranty cases. 7 Of course, removal of

13. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
14. See Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Negligence Without Fault,54 CAL. L. REv. 1422, 1472 (1966)
(stating that it is preferable for the manufacturer to bear the loss of defective products since he "can
protect himself againstjust that kind of loss by insurance or price computation"); Fleming James, Jr.,
ProductsLiability, 34 TEx. L. REV. 192, 215 (1955) (discussing the imposition of strict liability for
ultrahazardous products and noting that "[t]his would pave the way for liberating this branch of the law
from the restrictions on warranties which operate so arbitrarily and capriciously" in the commercial
context); Page Keeton,ProductsLiability--LiabilityWithoutFaultandthe RequirementofaDefect,41
TEx.L. REv. 855, 859 (1 963) ("If... the underlying basis for the imposition of strict liability is the
notion that the manufacturer is a better risk bearer because of his capacity to shift losses incurred from
the use of the products to the consuming public generally, then.., the problem is one of allocating...
losses resulting from.., the use of a product."); Dix W. Noel, ManufacturersofProducts-TheDrift
TowardStrictLiability,24 TENN.L. Rv. 963, 1010 (1957) ("[S]trict liability ofthe manufacturer would
serve to provide a desirable spreading of the risk or of the loss caused by defective products. The
spreading would be accomplished by removing the burden from the injured individual to the
manufacturer, who is ...
in a [better] position to pass on the costs to the users ofthe product by raising
prices ... to cover the cost ofjudgments or of insurance."); see also Santor v. A & M Karagheusian,
Inc., 207 A.2d 305, 311-12 (N.J. 1965) (Francis, J.) ("[Tihe great mass of the purchasing public has
neither adequate knowledge nor sufficient opportunity to determine if articles bought or used are
defective. Obviously they must rely upon the skill, care and reputation of the maker.... The purpose
of [strict] liability is to insure that the cost of injuries or damage... resulting from defective products,
is borne by the makers of the products who put them in the channels oftrade, rather than by the injured
or damaged persons who ordinarily are powerless to protect themselves."); Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 83 (N.J. 1960) (Francis, J.) ("Under modern conditions the ordinary layman
...
has neither the opportunity nor the capacity to inspect or to determine the fitness of an automobile
for use; he must rely on the manufacturer who has control of its construction, and to some degree on
the dealer who, to the limited extent called for by the manufacturer's instructions, inspects and services
it before delivery.").
15. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel,supra note 10, at 1127-34. In discussing the use of
warranty to achieve strict liability, Prosser argued that "the concept ofwarranty has involved so many
major difficulties and disadvantages that it is very questionable whether it has not become rather a
burden than a boon to the courts in what they are trying to accomplish." Id. at 1127.
16. Id. at 1134 ("If there is to be strict liability in tort, let there be strict liability in tort, declared
outright, without an illusory contract mask.").
17. See U.C.C. § 2-318 cmt. 2 (1987) ("The purpose ofthis section is to give certain beneficiaries
the benefit of the same warranty which the buyer received in the contract of sale, thereby freeing any
such beneficiaries from any technical rules as to 'privity."'); see, e.g., Cigna Ins. Co. v. Oy Saunatec,
Ltd., 241 F.3d 1, 15 n.12 (1st Cir. 2001) (stating that "[ulnlike a contract based warranty, the implied
warranty applies even though the parties are not in privity"); In re Bridgestone/Firestone Inc. Tires
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the privity requirement means that plaintiffs can sue remote parties who have not
had the opportunity to require the plaintiffs to sign a disclaimer. 8 Therefore, the
consequence of the abolition of privity is twofold. Moreover, Prosser's concern
about the reliance requirement in warranty was met by its dilution in Article 2"9 and
by courts' further dilution of even the basis of the bargain requirement." Prosser

Prods. Liab. Litig.,No. IP 00-9373-C-B/S, 2001 WL 1735050, at*21 (S.D. Ind.Dec. 31,2001) (noting
that"privity is not required for breach of implied warranty actions under Michigan law"); Dawson v.
Canteen Corp., 212 S.E.2d 82,82-83 (W. Va. 1975) (abolishing "the requirement ofprivity of contract
in actions grounded in breach of express or implied warranty").
18. U.C.C.§ 2-318 (1987);see, e.g., Patty Precision Prods. Co. v. Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co., 846
F.2d 1247,1252 (1OthCir. 1988) (holding that manufacturer's disclaimer ofimpliedwarranties in sale
to dealer did not preclude the ultimate purchaser from bringing a warranty action against the
manufacturer); Ferragamo v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 481 N.E.2d 477,482-83 (Mass. 1985) (holding
that seller's disclaimer ofwarranties insale to employer didnotpreclude employee from bring abreach
of warranty action); Velez v. Craine & Clark Lumber Corp., 305 N.E.2d 750, 753-54 (N.Y. 1973)
(holding that seller's disclaimer of warranties in sale to contractor did not apply to contractor's
employees who "were complete strangers to the contract").
19. The U.C.C.'s express warranty provision, § 2-313, requires that a seller's representation be
part ofthe "basis ofthe bargain" in order for it to qualify as an express warranty. U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(a)
(1987). Section 12 of the Uniform Sales Act was the precursor to the U.C.C.'s express warranty
provision. Section 12 provided that
[a]ny affirmation of fact or any promise by the seller relating to the goods is an express
warranty if the natural tendency of such affirmation or promise is to induce the buyer to
purchase the goods, and ifthebuyerpurchases the goods relyingthereon. No affirmation of
the value ofthe goods, nor any statementpurportingto be a statement ofthe seller's opinion
only shall be construed as a warranty.
UNIF. SALES ACr § 12 (1906) (emphasis added). Although courts and commentators have interpreted
§ 2-313's "basis of the bargain" requirement differently, most agree that the requirement is a more
relaxed standard than § 12's "reliance" requirement See, e.g., Lutz Farms v. Asgrow Seed Co., 948
F.2d 638, 644-45 (10th Cir. 1991) (finding reliance is not required to create express warranties);
Mainline Tractor & Equip. Co. v. Nutrite Corp., 937 F. Supp. 1095,1106 (D. Vt. 1996) (holding that
the lack of evidence ofparticular reliance does notpreclude an express warranty action); Murphy v.
Mallard Coach Co., 582 N.Y.S.2d 528, 530 (App. Div.) (declining to accept the argument that the
warranty must be a procuring cause of the contract in order to be part of the basis of the bargain).
20. In interpreting § 2-313's "basis of the bargain" requirement, many courts hold that the buyer
need not have relied on the seller's affirmation about the product in order for the affirmation to be part
of the "basis of the bargain." See, e.g., Martin v. Am. Med. Sys., 116 F.3d 102, 105 (4th Cir. 1997)
("Any description ofthe goods, other than the seller's mere opinion about the product, constitutes part
of the basis ofthe bargain.... It is unnecessary that the buyer actually rely uponit."); PPG Indus., Inc.
v. JMB/Houston Ctrs. Partners Ltd. P'ship, 41 S.W.3d 270, 283 (Tex. App. 2001) ("In actualpractice
affirmations of fact made by the seller about the goods during a bargain are regarded as part of the
description of those goods; hence no particular reliance on such statements need be shown in order to
weave them into the fabric ofthe agreement.") (quoting U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 3 (1987). But see Danise
v. Safety-Kleen Corp., 17 F. Supp. 2d 87, 97 (D. Conn. 1998) ("In order for a statement to form part
of the basis of the bargain between parties, the buyer must demonstrate that he relied on the
statement."); Hillcrest Country Club v. N.D. Judds Co., 461 N.W.2d 55, 61 (Neb. 1990) (holding that
the plaintiff must prove reliance in order to establish that an affirmation was part of the basis of the
bargain).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2002

5

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 4 [2002], Art. 13

1072

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53: 1067

also underestimated the cleverness of plaintiffs' lawyers and the willingness of
some courts to expand warranty liability by hobbling other warranty defenses. 2'
This expansion of tort in the courts and in the ALI and the later paring down

of warranty defenses by the courts mostly happened before Judge Posner and his
posse galloped to the defendants' aid.' In Prosser's day the very idea of a "least

cost risk avoider"-or for that matter the notion that the consumer, by insuring or by
being more careful, might be the least cost risk avoider-was unknown to academic
lawyers. There was no intellectually respectable, theoretical argument against
shifting the risk from the plaintiff (read injured consumer) to the defendant (read
large, corporate manufacturer).
The collision of tort and warranty arising from the work of Prosser, Cardozo,
Traynor, and others, probably was not foreseen by them even though it was made
inevitable by their individual acts. By their success in the courts and in the ALI,

Prosser and his friends hastened and intensified the collision.
III. RECENT HISTORY

In the last thirty years, the reverberations from the collision have come one
after another. Courts must sort through the defenses unique to tort to be sure that
they are not applied in warranty, and vice versa. Courts must define "defect" in
each regime and must ask how the damages in one regime might differ from those
in the other. Among the most persistent of the consequences of the collision of tort
and warranty is the need to draw the line between injury to life, limb and

21. Section 2-607(3) requires that the buyer notify the seller of the breach "within a reasonable
time"before bringing a warranty action. U.C.C. § 2-607(3) (1987). However, somejurisdictions provide
that a third-party beneficiary who is injured by a defective product is not required to give notice. See,
e.g., Cole v. Keller Indus., Inc., 132 F.3d 1044, 1047 (4th Cir. 1998) (adopting the majority approach
"that a non-purchaser in a suit on warranty, need not comply with the notice requirement ofthe Uniform
Commercial Code in order to recover for personal injuries rather than for economic loss"); Morgan v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 700 F. Supp. 1574,1582 (N.D. Ga. 1988) ("[T]he notice provisions of[§ 2-607]
cannot apply to a plaintiff who is a third-party beneficiary .. "); Yates v. Pitman Mfg., Inc., 514
S.E.2d 605,607 (Va. 1999) (holding that buyer's employee who was injured by defective product was
not required to give notice of breach of warranty because the employee was not the "buyer" of the
product). Additionally, some jurisdictions allow the plaintiffto sue the manufacturer, withoutproviding
the manufacturer with notice of the breach, as long as the plaintiff provides notice to the seller from
whom the plaintiffdirecfly purchased the product. See, e.g., Wright v. Brooke Group Ltd., 114F. Supp.
2d 797, 830 (N.D. Iowa 2000) (holding thatplaintiffwas notrequired to provide cigarette manufacturer
with notice of defect because the manufacturer did not sell cigarettes to the plaintiff); Seaside Resorts,
Inc. v. Club Car, Inc., 308 S.C. 47, 59,416 S.E.2d 655,663 (Ct. App. 1992) ("In the context of Section
[2-607(3)] .... the term'seller' means the immediate seller with whom the buyerhas contracted for the
goods, not a remote seller who did not tender the goods to the buyer. Thus, this section requires a retail
buyer to notify only the retail seller who tendered the goods to him, not wholesalers, distributors,
manufacturers, or others who sold the goods further up the chain of commerce.").
22. See WHITE, supranote 10, at 219-23 (describing Posner's contributions to, and identifying
flaws in, economic tort theory); James R. Hackney, Jr., Law and NeoclassicalEconomics: Science,
Politics,and the ReconfigurationofAmerican Tort Law Theory, 15 LAw & HIsT. REv. 275, 316-21
(1997) (describing Posner's economic approach to tort theory and products liability).
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property-the domain of both tort and warranty-and injury that is purely economic,
the exclusive domain of warranty. Consider the following examples.
A 1999 decision of the New York Court of Appeals and the responses of the
ALI and the NCCUSL to that decision expose the most basic potential conflict
between tort and warranty--a conflict about the standard of liability. In Denny v.
FordMotor Co., Mrs. Denny, attempting to avoid a deer, rolled her Ford SUV.'
Her arm came out through the sunroof and was badly injured.2 4 At trial, Ford
convinced the jury that the SUV was not in a "defective condition unreasonably
dangerous" because the utility of having a car that would go off-road and through
deep snow was a benefit that outweighed the risk of rollover arising from a
correspondingly high center of gravity.' To Ford's surprise, the jury decided that
while the car was not in a "defective condition unreasonably dangerous," it was
nevertheless unmerchantable." Thus, Ford was liable in warranty but not in tort. In
charging the jury on the strict liability claim, the judge instructed the jury to
"balanc[e] the risks involved in using the product against the product's usefulness
and its costs and against the risks, usefulness and costs of the alternative design as
compared to the product defendant did market."'27 In charging the jury on the breach
of the implied warranty claim, the judge instructed the jury to determine whether
the SUV was "defective and not reasonably fit to be used for its intended
purpose."2 Thus, in finding the SUV unmerchantable, the jury apparently did not
compare the SUV's risks with its benefits as it had with respect to the strict liability
claim. In deciding whether the SUV was merchantable, the jury seems merely to
have considered Mrs. Denny's expectations as a consumer. 9
Denny was tried in federal court. Ford appealed and the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals certified the following three question to the Court of Appeals of New
York:
(1) [W]hether the strict products liability claim and the breach of
implied warranty claim are identical;
(2) whether, if the claims are different, the strict products
liability claim is broader than the implied warranty claim and
encompasses the latter; and
(3) whether, if the claims are different and a strict liability claim
may fail while an implied warranty claim succeeds, the jury's

23. Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 42 F.3d 106, 108 (2d Cir. 1994).
24. Id.
25. See id. at 108, 110; Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 662 N.E.2d 730, 731-32 (N.Y. 1995).
26. Denny, 42 F.3d at 110.
27. Id. at 108.
28. Id.
29. At trial, the plaintiffs introduced into evidence Ford marketing materials, which advertised
that the SUV was "suitab[le] for commuting and for suburban and city driving" and "'fashionable' in
some suburban areas." Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 662 N.E.2d 730, 732 (N.Y. 1995). Additionally, the
marketing materials emphasized that the SUV was particularly suitable for "women who may be
concerned about driving in snow and ice with their children." Id.
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finding of no product defect
is reconcilable with its finding of
30
a breach of warranty.
The Court of Appeals of New York held that the meaning of "defective" in
strict tort was not necessarily the same as "unmerchantable" in warranty and that
a warranty claim could survive in a personal injury case even when a strict tort

claim failed.31
The Denny outcome was a surprise to many who had never imagined that
"unmerchantable" could have one meaning and "defective" another. 32 Among
those most concerned with the decision were the Reporters and others involved
with the ProductsLiabilityRestatement.3 3 The proponents of the ProductsLiability
Restatementhad just fought for four years in the ALI debating, among other things,
whether a balancing of risk with utility was the proper test of defectiveness. 34 They
feared that every clever plaintiff could avoid the Restatement's command to
compare risk with utility simply by bringing a warranty claim.
Ford and its friends came to the drafters of the Article 2 revision for help. They
left with what is known to the cognoscenti as the "Denny comment." That comment

reads as follows:
Suppose that an unmerchantable lawn mower causes personal
injury to the buyer, who is operating the mower. Without more,
the buyer can sue the seller for breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability and recover for injury to person "proximately
resulting" from the breach. Section 2-715(2)(b).35

30. Id. at 733.
31. Id. at 734-39.
32. See Franklin, supra note 1, at 979-80 (noting that Justice Traynor was the only judge to
conclude that a defect in tort could be different from "'umnerchantable' in sales warranty law").
33. In comment n to the Restatement(Third)of Torts: ProductsLiability § 2, the Reporters state
that a plaintiff's "failure to meet the requisites of § 2(a), (b), or (c)
will defeat a cause of action under
either negligence, strict liability, or the implied warranty of merchantability." REsTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF ToRTs: PRODUcTs LIABILITY § 2 Reporters' Notes cmt. n (1998). The Reporters note that the Denny
court used independent tests for establishing defectiveness for strict liability and breach of warranty.
However, the reporters state that "[ft]his Restatement contemplates that a single tort definition ofdefect
will emerge regardless of the characterization of the claim as sounding in tort or implied warranty of
merchantability. Id. Notably, the Reporters cite a critique of Denny written by Victor Schwartz and
Mark Behrens, two scholars who are usually aligned with defendants in tort debates. See id. (citing
Victor E. Schwartz & Mark A. Behrens, An Unhappy Return to Confusion in the Common Law of
Products Liability-Denny v. Ford Motor Company Should Be Overturned, 17 PACE L. Rnv. 359
(1997)).
34. See Owen, supra note 7, at 279 (describing ALI debate over the Products Liability
Restatement and noting that the ALI voted on four different drafts over a period of four years before
agreeing on the final version).
35.

NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, AMENDMENTS TO UNIFORM

COMMERCIALCODEARTICLE2-SALES 70 (Draft, Aug. 10, 2001) (proposing changes to U.C.C. § 2-314,
cmt. 7).
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The proposed comment 7 continues:
This opportunity does not resolve the tension between
warranty law and tort law where goods cause personal injury or
property damage. The primary source of that tension arises from
disagreement over whether the concept of defect in tort and the
concept of merchantability in Article 2 are coextensive where
personal injuries are involved, i.e., if goods are merchantable
under warranty law can they still be defective under tort law, and
if goods are not defective under tort law can they be
unmerchantable under warranty law? The answer to both
questions should be no, and the tension between merchantability
in warranty and defect in tort where personal injury or property
damage is involved should be resolved as follows:
When recovery is sought for injury to person or property,
whether goods are merchantable
is to be determinedby applicable
36
stateproducts liability law.
Whether the revision of Article 2 will ever become law and, if so, whether the
Denny comment will have the intended effect, remains to be seen. As this is written,
the train on which the comment has a ticket-the revision of Article 2-has yet to
leave the station.
Another quite obvious issue caused by the collision has also been one of the
most intractable.37 Since strict tort covers only injury to life, limb, and property but
not "economic" injury, how does one draw the line between "economic" loss and
other loss? The test that travels in the words ofjudges and trial lawyers under the
rubric "economic loss doctrine," is far from perfect. The loss of an arm by a major
league pitcher to a defective power saw will be a severe "economic" loss, yet the
pitcher can clearly state a case in strict tort for the injury. Furthermore, what if the
defect in the power saw does not cause catastrophic injury, but only a gradual yet
early destruction of the saw itself?,3 Courts must place cases on one or the other

36. Id. (emphasis added).
37. See William Powers, Jr. & Margaret Niver, Negligence, Breach of Contract, and the
"'EconomicLoss" Rule, 23 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 477,481 (1992) (noting that the economic loss rule is
controversial and that "different courts have disagreed about the precise boundary between property
damage and economic loss"); Steven C. Tourek et al.,Buckingthe "Trend": The Uniform Commercial
Code, the Economic Loss Doctrine, and Common Law Causes of Action for Fraud and
Misrepresentation,84 IOwA L. REv. 875, 891-92 (1999) (asserting that the economic loss rule was
intended to apply only to negligence and strict liability claims and not fraud or misrepresentation

claims).
38. Somejurisdictions provide an exception to the economic loss rule for situations inwhich the
injury was caused by "a sudden and highly dangerous occurrence." See, e.g., Vulcan Materials Co. v.
Driltech, Inc., 306 S.E.2d 253, 257 (Ga. 1983) (adopting exception to the economic loss rule for "a
sudden and calamitous eventwhich, although itmay only cause damage to the defective product itself,
poses an unreasonable risk ofinjury to other persons or property."); Mars, Inc. v. Heritage Builders of
Effingham, Inc., 763 N.E.2d 428,434 (1. App. Ct. 2002) (noting that economic loss doctrine bars tort
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side of the economic loss line to determine whether the plaintiff can state a case in
both tort and warranty or only in warranty.
Consider finally the reverberation I discuss below. Breach of warranty occurs

and the cause of action arises upon the sale of an unmerchantable product.39 The
buyer's knowledge of, or appreciation for, the defect is not relevant.' If the buyer
discovers the defect before four years have passed, he may recover damages." That
is so whether his damages are a grave injury to life, limb, or property or whether the
injury is but a small diminution in value (because of the defect) from what was

promised.
In tort, the judges and scholars generally require more than diminished value.
Usually the courts call for a "manifestation" of the defect or some measurable
damage to a person or property. It is not necessarily enough that the product is
defective. But even in tort there must be cases where one is not required to ride his
Ford Explorer or Bridgestone tires over the brink before he can sue, not so? 2 The
issues I discuss below should perhaps be regarded as a subspecies of the economic
loss question, but they are not entirely comfortable in that category.
IV. DAMAGES IN TORT AND WARRANTY FOR INCHOATE INJURY

Nowhere is the difference between tort and warranty more stark, or the
confusion more deep, than when defective and potentially dangerous goods have
yet to cause physical injury. Since physical injury is never a requirement for
warranty recovery, at least modest damages are always available to one suing in
warranty because of a defective product. Tort, on the other hand, was slow to
recognize injuries, such as emotional distress, that one could not see and touch.4'
recovery for product deterioration, but does not bar recovery caused by a "sudden or dangerous
occurrence"); Hofsteev. Dow, 36 P.3d 1073,1077 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) ("Ifthe [product] failure was
a sudden and dangerous event, it constitutes a tort," rather than a breach ofwarranty). But see E. River
S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858,870 (1986) (declining to adopt the sudden injury
exception to the economic loss rule and noting that "[e]ven when the harm to the product itself occurs
through an abrupt, accident-like event, the resulting loss due to repair costs, decreased value, and lost
profits is essentially the failure of the purchaser to receive the benefit of its bargain-traditionally the
core concern of contract law.").
39. U.C.C. § 2-725(2) (1987).
40. Id.
41. U.C.C. § 2-725(1) (1987).
42. Seen re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 155 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1104-05
(S.D. Ind. 2001) (holding that Michigan's economic loss doctrine did not bar consumers' tort claims
against tire manufacturer for selling tires that had propensity for tread separation but which had not yet
caused injury to person orproperty); cf.Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 808-17,
821-26 (Cal. 1993) (allowing possible recovery of damages for medical monitoring costs and fear of
developing cancer to plaintiffs who had been exposed to carcinogens but who had suffered no
cognizable injury).
43. See David Crump, EvaluatingIndependent TortsBased Upon "Intentional"or "Negligent"
Infliction ofEmotionalDistress:How Can We Keep the Babyfrom Dissolvingin the Bath Water?, 34
ARIZ. L. REv.439,446-47 (1992) (noting that emotional distress claims are a modem phenomenon and
that efforts have been made to limit such claims); see also Daniel Givelber, The Right to Minimum
Social Decency and the Limits of Evenhandedness: IntentionalInfliction of EmotionalDistress by
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Even § 402A itself speaks of "physical harm thereby caused." 4 Thus, it is not
surprising to find that many courts decline to grant recovery for defective and
dangerous products that have not yet taken their bite. As the following discussion
shows, the courts often ignore the difference in the theories and sometimes wander
willy-nilly between liability and damages.
As I suggest above, the world of warranty is comfortable with the idea that a
plaintiffcan recover from his seller for a defect in a product even though that defect
has not caused, and may never cause, any injury to person or property. This is
implicit in the idea that the statute of limitations commences to run on the sale
under § 2-725's and is recognized by the normal standard ofrecovery for breach of
warranty that is stated in § 2-714(2): "The measure of damages for breach of
warranty is the difference at the time and place of acceptance between the value of
the goods accepted and the value they would have had if they had been as
warranted .... ,,4 If a computer program is unmerchantable because of a bug, the
buyer need only show that the bug has reduced the value of the program by ten
dollars. The ten dollars is available even if the bug has caused no idiosyncratic
damage during the buyer's use. It is enough that the buyer has suffered a reduction
in his wealth. Note too that this rule applies equally to potentially dangerous
products. Ifthe Ford Explorer proves to be unmerchantable, buyers who have never
had a moment's trouble with their cars will state a case under § 2-314 and § 2-714
for the difference in value between the Explorer as warranted and the Explorer as
delivered.
Although some might cite the economic loss rule as a bar to recovery in strict
tort where there is danger but no overt damage to person or property,47 I do not
believe that the case is so clear. The usual work of the economic loss doctrine is to
bar tort recovery where the plaintiff's injury constitutes lost profits or injury to the
product itself and never could develop into personal injury or other property
damage.'
Furthermore, some tort cases do allow recovery for those with the merest of
physical injuries, and even a few for those who have fear and anxiety but no

Outrageous Conduct, 82 COLuM. L. REv. 42,43 (1982) (stating that the availability of intentional
infliction of emotional distress claims was advocated by scholars such as Magruder and Prosser in the
early twentieth century until the tort was recognized in the Restatement (Second)of Torts in 1965).
44. RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
45. U.C.C. § 2-725 (1987).
46. Id. § 2-714(2).
47. See In re Air Bag Prods. Liab. Litig., 7 F. Supp. 2d 792, 803 (E.D. La. 1998) (denying tort
recovery to plaintiffs who had suffered no injury, but who owned vehicles containing air bags that
would causeinjuryifdeployed); Nichols v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 99-C-566, 1999 WL 33292839, at
**3-4 (N.H. Super. Ct. Dec. 13, 1999) (holding that the economic loss doctrine barred plaintiffs
negligence and strict liability claims against manufacturer who installed allegedly defective seats in
plaintiffs car).
48. Mt. Lebanon Pers. Care Home, Inc. v. Hoover Universal, Inc., 276 F.3d 845, 848 (6th Cir.
2002) ("Economic loss is both loss in the value of a product caused by a defect in that product (direct
economic loss) and consequential loss flowing from the defect, such as lost profits (consequential
economic loss).'.
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physical injury.49 I am thinking of the thousands of plaintiffs who have recovered
from asbestos manufacturers and distributors even though the plaintiffs have no
more than tiny lesions on their lungs that may have come from asbestos and even
though those lesions may never turn into anything injurious."0 Also, consider
plaintiffs with fear and anxiety but no physical injury at all."'
The courts' analysis in these cases (and, one suspects, the lawyers' explanation)
has not been consistent or clear. One ofmy cases, Microsoft Corp.v. Manning,was
a straightforward warranty suit in which the plaintiffs complained of a bug and
sought damages under § 2-714 even though they had suffered no more than a
modest diminution in value of their programs. 2 Another Texas case, Coghlan v.
WellcraftMarine Corp., was treated by the parties and the Fifth Circuit as a "breach
of contract" case. 3 In the latter case, Judge Jones let the plaintiffs go forward based
on what might have been called an express warranty that the boat was all fiberglass
when it apparently was a fiberglass sandwich with a wood filling. 4 Of course,
neither of these cases could have been made into tort claims, and it was easy for
Justice Cornelius in Manningto conclude that:
[I]f appellees prove that an individual defect exists in all original
MS-DOS 6.0 software, it is not necessary for the purchasers to
actually suffer a loss of data as a result of that defect for them to
suffer damage. They have received less than they bargained for

when they acquired the product.5 5

In all of my other cases, tort and warranty compete. Four are class actions against
auto manufacturers. Three are suits against heart valve manufacturers.

49. See Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 808-17, 821-26 (Cal. 1993)
(allowing possible recovery ofdamages for medical monitoring costs and fear of developing cancer to
plaintiffs who had been exposed to carcinogens but had suffered no cognizable injury).
50. See Herber v. Johns-Manville, Corp., 785 F.2d 79, 83, 85 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that
emotional distress and medical monitoring damages were available even though plaintiff's "lungs may
be characterized as involving little imp act and the pleural thickening as involving insubstantial injury';
Dartez v. Fibreboard Corp., 765 F.2d 456,468 (5th Cir. 1985) ("Under Texas law [plaintiff] is entitled
to compensation formental anguishproximately caused by his asbestos exposure, even ifsuch distress
arises from fear of diseases that are... not medically probable."); see also Christopher F. Edley, Jr. &
Paul C. WeilerAsbestos: A Multi-Billion-DollarCrisis,30 HARv.J. oNLEGIs. 383,393 (1993) (noting
that many asbestos "claims produce substantial payments ... even though the individual litigants will
never become impaired"); Richard A. Nagareda, Autonomy, Peace,andPut Optionsin theMass Tort
Class Action, 115 HARv.L.Rv. 747, 766 (2002) (noting that by the early 1990s, as many as half of
all asbestos claims were brought by plaintiffs with minimal or no physical impairment and many of
these plaintiffs were awarded substantial recovery).
51. See Potter,863 P.2d at 808-17, 821-26; Herber,785 F.2d at 85.
52. Microsoft Corp. v. Manning, 914 S.W.2d 602, 605-06 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995). The plaintiffs
only claimed damages for the $9.95 upgrade fee for a new version of the software that would have
corrected the defect. Id. at 606.
53. 240 F.3d 449, 451 (5th Cir. 2001).
54. Id. at 454-55.
55. Manning, 914 S.W.2d at 609.
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An early and frequently cited case, Willett v. Baxter International,Inc., was
written by Judge Wisdom for the Fifth Circuit in 1991.56 The two Louisiana
plaintiffs received artificial heart valves made of pyrolitic carbon." When one of
the plaintiffs, Mr. Willett, read of the defendant manufacturer's voluntary
suspension of the marketing of these valves, he sued.58 The trial court granted
summary judgment to the defendants and the Fifth Circuit affirmed.5
Judge Wisdom described the case as one under Louisiana's "products liability
law."6 Since Louisiana is the only state without Article 2 of the U.C.C., the suit
must have been and appears to be stated in Louisiana's version of strict tort. Under
Louisiana law, a product is defective only if one of the following four tests is met:
1) the product is unreasonably dangerous per se, 2) the product was defectively
manufactured, 3) the product was defectively designed, or 4) the manufacturer
failed to warn of a non-obvious inherent danger.61 With his usual care and clarity,
Judge Wisdom went through each of the four possibilities and concludes that the
plaintiffs could not state a case for a defect under any of them.62 Applying the
risk/utility standard, he noted that approximately nineteen thousand persons had
received these valves and that only seventeen failures had been reported. 3 Since all,
or almost all, of the nineteen thousand recipients would have died shortly thereafter,
had they not received the valves," and since there was no evidence that better ones
were available at the time these were used,65 the case against the valves being
"defective" on a risk/utility basis was strong, even ifa small percentage would fail.
The plaintiffs apparently argued that their anxiety about the possibility of
failure, anxiety that had surely been heightened by the defendant manufacturer's
suspension of sales, was a compensable injury.6 Judge Wisdom expressed
reservation about recovery for such a claim: "[W]e have serious concerns about
permitting recovery for such fear absent actual failure ofthe valve."67 Furthermore,
the judge declined to "decide these issues... because of our resolution of the defect
issue."6 Therefore, in dictum and in what appears to be a tort case, Judge Wisdom
hinted that the plaintiffs could not recover until "failure" ofthe product. Of course,
this could not be a statement about § 2-714 of the U.C.C. because that section has
not been adopted in Louisiana.

56. Willett v. Baxter Int'l, Inc., 929 F.2d 1094, 1095 (5th Cir. 1991).

57. Id. at 1095-96.
58. Id.

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 1095.
Id. at 1097.
Id.
Willett, 929 F.2d at 1097-99.
Id. at 1096.
Id. at 1097.
Id. at 1099.
Seeid. at 1099-1100.
Id.
Willett, 929 F.2d at 1100.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2002

13

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 4 [2002], Art. 13
1080

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53: 1067

Two other cases, Khan v. Shiley Inc.69 and Hagepanosv. Shiley, Inc.7° present
issues similar to those presented in Willett but against a different artificial heart
valve manufacturer. Mr. Hagepanos received a Shiley heart valve implant in 1982
at a time when Shiley stated that the failure rate was one in one hundredth of one
percent (i.e. one in ten thousand). 7' Estimates six years later put the failure rate
between one in one hundred and one in ten.72 Unlike Willett, Hagepanos asserted
a variety of claims ranging from strict tort to breach of warranty. 7s Applying
Maryland law, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower court's dismissal on the
ground that one cannot recover "future damages" in Maryland unless one can show
that the occurrence of those damages is more probable than not (i.e., that more than
50 in 100 valves would fail).7 4

The court rejected Hagepanos's argument that he was entitled to "present"
damages arising from his "present fear. ' '7 ' The court stated that such a recovery
would be an evasion of Maryland's rule, for one could always claim distress about
the future. 76 Despite plaintiff s inclusion of a warranty claim, there is no discussion
of § 2-714 in the Hagepanosopinion, nor is there any suggestion that the plaintiffs
ever asserted a claim under that section.
In Khan v. Shiley Inc., Judy Khan fared a little better in court. She received a
Shiley artificial heart valve implant in 1983. 7 ' The valve worked fine; it remedied
the serious problems she had been experiencing, such as fatigue, double vision, and
shortness of breath.78 In 1985, Shiley recalled many valves, including Khan's. 7 The
recall was accompanied by new information that the valves were failing at a rate
slightly greater than 1 in 1008" and by the admonition that one should "go to the
nearest hospital if [the] valve ceased to operate" because the failure "could be
fatal."'" One would not have to be paranoid to read that warning to mean that only
those who suffered failure while in the operating room of a major hospital were
likely to survive a failure. The term "recall" may be too generous since one's risk
of death from a second operation to implant a new heart valve was greater than the
risk of failure in keeping the original valve implanted. 2

69. 217 Cal. App. 3d 848 (Ct. App. 1990).
70. No. 87-3141, 1988 WL 35752 (4th Cir. Apr. 18, 1988); 846 F.2d 71 (4th Cir. 1988)
(unpublished table decision).
71. Id. at **I.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Hagepanos, 1988 WL 35752, at *1.
77. Khan v. Shiley, Inc., 217 Cal. App. 3d 848, 850 (Ct. App. 1990).
78. Id. at 851.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 851 n.1.
81. Id. at 851.
82. Id.
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Khan sued in strict tort, fraud, implied and express warranty, and several other
causes of action. 3 The trial court dismissed them all, explaining that "there's no
indication this valve ha[d] failed or will fail" and that "[t]here's been nobody
injured yet .... We've been asked to speculate about something that may or may
not happen, and there is no allegation... that show[s] any basis now that there is
a defect."' The trial court's statement could be interpreted to mean that when there
is no injury (i.e., no liability), there are no damages, even in warranty.
The court of appeals' decision is worse. At one point, Judge Sonenshine seems
to be saying that there is no liability: "[The plaintiffs] insist the owner ofa product,
functioning as intended but containing an inherent defect which may cause the
product to fail in the future, has an action against the manufacturer. Plaintiffs are
mistaken." 5 This paragraph, apparently considering liability, is followedby several
paragraphs that note the absence of the "essential element of causation."86 That
sounds like a statement that there are no compensable damages. The court
concluded this part of the opinion with a flatly erroneous statement: "So long as
the valve continues to function, no cause of action exists under any products
liability theory.""7 When applied to warranty, one of the theories Khan pled as part
of her "products liability" case, this statement is incorrect. Whether Mrs. Khan can
recover more than the diminution in value under § 2-714 is questionable, but she
could surely have recovered the difference in value between a valve as warranted
and the valve as delivered if she could have shown that her valve was
unmerchantable or deviated from the seller's express warranty. As it was, the court
bone at the end of the opinion by reinstating her fraud claim
threw Khan a small
8s

against Shiley.
A third set of opinions, Carlsonv. GeneralMotors Corp., 9 Briehlv. General
Motors Corp.,9 Haenisch v. General Motors Corp.9" and In re
Bridgestone/Firestone,Inc. Tires Products,92 arose from class actions that sought
recovery from auto manufacturers and their suppliers for injuries arising from
allegedly defective products that did not cause personal injury or property damage.
The earliest case, Carlson, was a pure warranty claim for "lost resale value"
attributable to the poor operation and poor reputation of a line of diesel engines that
GM had installed in its trucks.3 The second case, Briehl, was also primarily a
warranty suit; it did not state a strict tort cause of action.94 In Briehl, the anti-lock
brakes on the SUVs apparently had an unusual characteristic: when they were in
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Khan, 217 Cal. App. 3d at 851-52.
Id. at 853 (first alteration in original).
Id. at 854 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 855.
Id. at 857.

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 857-58.
883 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1989).
172 F.3d 623 (8th Cir. 1999).
Nos. 98 C 5836, MDL 1266, 2001 W'L 103434 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 31, 2001).
155 F. Supp. 2d 1069 (S.D. Ind. 2001).
Carlson, 883 F.2d at 289.
Brieh, 172 F.3d at 625.
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operation, the pedal would go all the way to the floor.9" The plaintiffs claimed that
this would mislead the driver who would associate that action with brake failure.96
There was no claim that the brakes malfunctioned in any other way. In Haenisch,
the plaintiffs complained of a "Type III" door latch that would allow a door to pop
open in certain circumstances.97 The door latches could be replaced for $3.09
each.9" In Carlson, Brielh, and Haenisch, the courts granted the defendants'
motions to dismiss or motions for summary judgment.99

The court in Carlsoncorrectly dismissed the claim because the plaintiffs failed
properly to allege a breach of warranty. They appear to have claimed that their
vehicles were defective because they had "diminished resale value."10 Diminished
resale value might be the measure of damages under § 2-714 for a plaintiff who
could prove that the diminution came from a breach of warranty,10 ' but these
plaintiffs did not claim this. The plaintiffs confused damages with liability and were
properly dismissed.'
The recent decision by Judge Barker in the Bridgestone-Ford Explorer case was
uncommonly acute. The opinion came on Ford and Bridgestone's motion to dismiss
"dozens" of class actions that were consolidated in the federal district court in
Indianapolis. 3 There were separate classes consisting of those who had certain
Bridgestone tires and those who owned or leased Ford Explorers, regardless of their
tires.' 4 Excluded from these suits was anyone who had suffered any personal injury
or property damage. 05 With a few exceptions, the suits stated causes of action in
tort and in warranty.' 6
Although the plaintiffs stated their tort claim in negligence, the court read it as
a "classic product liability tort claim" and dismissed it on the ground that there
were no "cognizable tort injuries."'0 7 In reaching that conclusion, Judge Barker
relied on Prosser and Keeton and cited several of the cases discussed above as well
as others that deny recovery. 8 She also rejected the plaintiffs' analogy to asbestos
exposure, where one exposed could experience a twenty- or thirty-year progression

95. Id. at 626.
96. Id.
97. Haenisch, 2001 WL 103434, at *1.
98. Haenisch v. Gen. Motors Corp., Nos. 98 C 5836,99 C 2566, MDL 1266,2001 WL 548755,
at *1 (N.D. Il. May 21, 2001).
99. Briehl, 172 F.3d at 630; Carlson, 883 F.2d at 298; Haenisch, 2001 WL 103434, at *5.
100. Carlson, 883 F.2d at 297.

101. See U.C.C. § 2-714(2) (1987).
102. Carlson, 883 F.2d at 298.
103. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 155 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1076-77
(S.D. Ind.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

2001).
Id. at 1077.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1086-87.
Id. at 1086-89.
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of the disease without having any symptoms."0 9 The alleged deterioration of the
Bridgestone tires was not similar."1
Judge Barker then turned to the claims of breach of implied and express
warranty. Noting that warranty claims "accrue" on sale and therefore that the
warranty must be breached then or not at all, she concluded that there can be a
breach of warranty without physical injury."' She correctly distinguished many of
the apparently contrary cases by noting that they were not "no injury or no damage"
cases but "no liability" cases."' If the product is merchantable, afortiorithere can
be no damages for breach of the warranty of merchantability.
The courts in Briehl andHaenisch were not as careful as the courts in Carlson
and Bridgestone. In Biehl, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's
dismissal."' The Eighth Circuit was critical of the plaintiffs' conclusory pleading,
but the court failed to draw a sharp line between warranty and tort." 4 Despite the
fact that the plaintiffs did not state a strict tort or negligence cause of action, the
court cited a string of tort actions and concluded that the plaintiffs failed to "allege
any manifest defect."".. Read generously, the court's opinion might be a statement
that the plaintiffs failed to allege a defect; read less generously, one might conclude
that the court mixed tort with warranty.
In Haenisch,Judge Zagel first expressed the opinion that the plaintiffs had not
shown the possibility that they could put forward facts from which one might
conclude that the GM door latches were defective." 6 He noted that only a small
percentage of the 40 million latches on the roadhad ever failed and expressed doubt
that such a failure rate in such circumstances could ever render the latches
unmerchantable." 7 So far so good. Although he acknowledged that the "central
allegation" was breach of "express and implied warranties,"". he then cited several
tort cases to support his conclusion that the plaintiffs had not alleged compensable
damages." 9 This is not so good.
V. CONCLUSION
Using the foregoing nine cases as examples, consider what the law is and what
it should be. First, any plaintiff must show that his goods are unmerchantable to
state a claim under § 2-314.2 That a product does not meet a plaintiff s subjective

109. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Prods. Liab. Litig, 155 F. Supp. 2d at 1087-88.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1099.
112. Id. at 1100.
113. Briehl v. Gen. Motors Corp., 172 F.3d 623, 625 (8th Cir. 1999).
114. See id.at 627-28.
115. Id.
116. Haenischv. Gen. Motors Corp., Nos. 98 C5836, MDL 1266,2001 WL 103434, at *2 (N.D.
IM.Jan. 31, 2001)
117. Id. at *5.
118. Id. at *1.
119. Id. at *2-5.
120. Or that the goods violate an express warranty to state a claim under § 2-313.
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expectations is not enough. Courts and parties must be careful to avoid the
confusion present in cases like Carlsonwhere the plaintiffs appear to have claimed
that the decline in value of their vehicles itself showed that the goods were not
merchantable. This same confusion attends part of the Haenisch opinion. Many of
the cases were, and should have been, resolved in favor of the defendants because
the plaintiffs had no chance of proving a defect. Careful readers of these cases will
note that any discussion of damages that follows a finding of defect is dictum.
Second, damages are always available in warranty to one who has proven
breach of warranty. At a minimum, those damages equal the diminution in value
of that product attributable to that breach of warranty whether the defect has caused
or can ever causephysicalinjury. Judges Barker and Jones have it exactly right. To
the extent that they say the opposite, Judges Zagel and Melloy are wrong."'
Finally, the courts should reject imprecise pleading and argument that claims
merely "products liability" and fails to distinguish tort from warranty. Barring tort
recovery for inchoate injury is probably wise, and whether wise or not, is the
current law, but that can be done only by careful distinction between the two
claims.

121. I leave the hard questions raised by these cases for others to resolve: Should a plaintiffwho
sues in warranty but who has not yet suffered physical injury be permitted to recover more thanjust the
diminution in value? One thing is clear to me; ifwe are to allow more than diminution in value, the rule
here should be the same in tort and warranty. There is no reason to allow Judy Khan to recover in
warranty for her anxiety under § 2-715 at a time when we would not allow her to recover in strict tort.
If there are sound policies against recovery of such losses before manifestation of the physical injury,
they apply equally in tort and in warranty.
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